
A hundredth is a pink apostrophe between the words “Great” and “Britain” đđ¤Ł

Non aver paura, ogni vita è un dono â¤
Don’t be afraid, every life’s a gift â¤
#SindromediDown
#DownSyndrome
#DownSyndromeDay
Ă di quattro morti e diciassette feriti, di cui sei gravi, il primo bilancio dei tre contemporanei attentati a Vienna di lunedĂŹ sera. Appena quattro giorni dopo i vili assalti di Nizza, un nuovo attacco ha insanguinato il cuore dellâEuropa. Il Vecchio Continente, però, non è esente da responsabilitĂ . E non solo per le folli politiche di accoglienza indiscriminata, ma anche – se non soprattutto – per unâassurda Weltanschauung che ha come unico orizzonte lâautodistruzione […].
L’editoriale di stamattina.
https://www.romait.it/attentati-a-vienna-quelle-dei-leader-mondiali-sono-lacrime-di-coccodrillo.html
https://www.quiitalia.eu/attentati-a-vienna-lipocrita-cordoglio-dei-megafoni-del-politically-correct.html
Che il semi-lockdown instaurato con lâultimo Dpcm del 24 ottobre avrebbe scatenato proteste e rivolte era facilmente prevedibile. Meno scontato era che le prese di distanza provenissero anche dallâinterno della stessa maggioranza rosso-gialla. Che deve decidere cosa vuol fare da grande, attuando una strategia di lungo respiro che consenta di governare lâemergenza, senza limitarsi a inseguirla […].
L’editoriale di oggi.
https://www.romait.it/semi-lockdown-lipocrisia-della-maggioranza-incapace-di-governare-la-crisi.html
https://www.quiitalia.eu/semi-lockdown-lattacco-ipocrita-di-chi-non-ha-il-coraggio-delle-sue-azioni.html
ÂŤSorrow engenders hatred, and resentment, which separate us from the Way drawn for us by the Heaven. We feel confused, lost, betrayed, and thus we shout out our despair to the Lord: why have you forsaken us?
And we donât realize that we are drifting away from Him, that Christ always walks beside us, and we donât want to listen to His voice, to the words He cried out from the Cross, and now are addressed to our soul: lama sabachthani?Âť
(M. Ciminiello, Astragon – LâEra del Drago).
Although a self-citation may be inelegant, a few days ago I was reminded of this passage: and it occurred to me that it may contain a clue on the nature of Hell.
Anything and everything has been said about this place/no place: some, like Jehovahâs Witnesses, donât think it exists; others, like most Christian theologians, believe itâs a physical location – a place of eternal damnation; Orthodox theologians claim itâs a real condition – but limited in time; finally, some argue that itâs an effective reality – but itâs empty.
20th century Italian mystic Maria Valtorta, author of The Gospel As Revealed to Me, reports that Jesus told her that, had Hell not existed, a bigger Hell would have been created for Judas. These words may confirm the existence of Hell – but they donât specify whatâs its nature.
Personally, I am persuaded that Hell is something more than the Kingdom of darkness and everlasting fire: I believe itâs a sign of us moving away from God. Every time we turn our back on Him, on His word, on His salvation, we dig a little bit of our personal Hell: and if soul longs, by nature, for the Highest Good, and the Supreme Happiness, then itâs consumed – like the most horrific fire – by the self-inflicted grief caused by the distance from the Infinite Love it aims at. In fact, as stated by the great G. K. Chesterton, ÂŤman cannot love mortal things. He can only love immortal things for an instantÂť (Heretics).
Then, our discomfort, our earthly suffering are reflected in the wound which only the Doctor of the soul can heal: a Doctor tormented by the same torments as ours because, being at once ÂŤHe who loves, He who is loved and Love itselfÂť (M. Ciminiello, Astragon – LâOmbra dellâAurora), He cannot but mourn our misery. That could be the thrust of Nietzscheâs insight, that ÂŤeven God has his hell: it is his love for mankindÂť (Thus spoke Zarathustra).
Thatâs why God will never give up on anyone of us: because itâs not His will ÂŤthat one of these little ones should perishÂť (Matthew 18, 14). If we abandon His path, bending our very nature, we ourselves will build our Hell. And this will be our punishment: weâll be well aware of what we lost, but there wonât be anything we can do about it.
áźÎ¸ÎŹÎ˝ÎąĎοΚ θνΡĎοί, θνΡĎο὜ áźÎ¸ÎŹÎ˝ÎąĎοΚ, Μ῜νĎÎľĎ Ďὸν áźÎşÎľÎŻÎ˝Ďν θΏνιĎον, Ďὸν δὲ áźÎşÎľÎŻÎ˝Ďν βίον Ďξθνξ῜ĎÎľĎ
Immortali mortali, mortali immortali, viventi la loro morte e morienti la loro vita.
Immortal mortals, mortal immortals, living the others’ death and dying the others’ life.
Each pray’r accepted, and each wish resign’d…
Alexander Pope, Eloisa to Abelard, 209-210.
Last summer, a young friend of mine asked me the following question: if God already knows that we are going to misbehave – then why doesnât He prevent us from doing it?
Thatâs a really clever question, which deals with two long-debated issues: free will and theological determinism. The latter is the view that all the events are pre-ordained by God, and itâs a special form of determinism: the philosophical position that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.
If this is the case – which I donât think[1] -, free will may be at risk, because man wouldnât really have a choice: to the extent that Martin Luther (De servo arbitrio, 1525) and John Calvin (De aeterna Dei praedestinatione, 1552) could claim, on this basis, that people canât achieve redemption through their own decisions, and are predestined to salvation or damnation regardless of merit and guilt.
This is in conflict with the Catholic tradition mostly represented by Saint Thomas Aquinas, who was sure that human beings have free will, and salvation depends on us. Yet, if so, another concern rises: the problem of theodicy, or divine justice. Put another way, why does Evil exist?
That leads us back to my friendâs question: if, in fact, God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, that would mean He knows what we are going to do and, since Heâs wholly good and has unlimited power, He could and should want to stop us from making bad decisions – then why does He let it happen?
Protestants try to respond we canât pretend to understand Godâs mind – which is actually a non-answer. On the other hand, those who relate the issue to peopleâs decisions, state that free will is a gift granted to us by God – thus, it canât be simply removed.
Thatâs an unsatisfactory answer, especially considering bad examples like Stalin or Mao or Hitler – but it can be a starting point. In fact, I think the premise that man has got free will is right[2] – and free will is the reason why bad things can happen. But thereâs another question to raise: what are the conditions which allow us to exercise free will?
In order to answer, Iâd like to quote Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who thought that men are the miracle of creation because, alone among all other beings, they are constrained by no limits, and can determine themselves according to their free will – unlike, e.g., the Angels, who are necessitated to do good (Oratio de hominis dignitate, 1486).
Thatâs the key point, to me. Evil is the flip side of free will – better, itâs a prerequisite for free will: because, if Evil didnât exist, man would have no choice – no other choice than doing good.
This means that God has a terrible price to pay, because He leaves us free to choose – to choose even our fate -, although it isnât His will âthat one of these little ones should perishâ (Matthew 18,14): thatâs what Friedrich Nietzsche called Godâs hell – His love for mankind (Also sprach Zarathustra, 1883-85). Such an absolute love as to enable man to rise to the level of the Angels, although this implies the risk of degenerating to the level of the brutes.
Therefore, free will may be the answer. And certainly, love is the last word.
[1] I donât want to enter into the debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism: for I view I subscribe to, I would refer to De Caro, Il libero arbitrio. Una introduzione, 2004.
[2] Again, Iâm not going to enter into the debate about the existence of free will: I shall confine myself to suggesting that the sceptical arguments, mostly based on a metaphysical background (see, e.g., Roderick Chisholm, Responsibility and Avoidability, 1961), can be opposed by De Caroâs argument (quoted above) about an ontological-causal pluralism, according to which men, as agents, can act through a peculiar form of causation, irreducible to physical causality.